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By examining Hayek’s approach to economic policy, this paper tries to show that his 
understanding of a free-market society was ambiguous, if not contradictory. Hayek was 
indeed following the Austrian tradition by rejecting technocratic views of policy-
making. Nevertheless, he advocated a constitutional approach ultimately based on the 
rule of law created behind a veil of ignorance. Regulation and a fairly extensive welfare 
state are not ruled out either, and are subject to evaluation through a mix of rule of law 
(what that means), public opinion, common sense.   
After close inspection of the Road to Serfdom, the Constitution of Liberty, Law, 
Legislation and Liberty this contribution concludes that not only does Hayek fail to 
provide clear answers to the fundamental questions of economic policy. He also 
advocates a Third Way characterised by enlightened social engineering. In particular, 
the state has the duty to provide a suitable framework for the individual to develop his 
action, and to meet those social needs that the market fails to satisfy.  
 
 
I am grateful to Carlo Lottieri, Anthony de Jasay, Henry Manne, Alberto Mingardi and
Miro Prokopijevic for many insightful comments and helpful suggestions on a previous 
draft of this paper.   
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Hayek and Economic Policy 
(The Austrian Road to the Third Way) 
  
On Hayek’s view of economic policy 
The debate on the scope and moral foundations of economic policy began as soon as 
economics strived to become something more than just a branch of political philosophy 
and attempted to acquire its own identity as a social science. By and large, its Founding 
Fathers characterised this discipline as being concerned with how individuals behave 
and interact in order to enhance their well-being. This justified the use of the term 
‘political economy’, to emphasise the role of the institutional context within which 
human action takes place. Towards the end of the XVIII century prominent authors 
went further and suggested that political economists should not be confined to the mere 
description and explanation of human action. Nor should they refrain from 
recommending how institutions ought to be designed and modified in order to enhance 
welfare
1. Adam Smith was of course a leading and effective supporter of this approach
2, 
which actually owed much to Galiani and, to a lesser extent, Quesnay.  
At the beginning of the new century Say forcefully advocated the need for a sharper 
partition between the realms of political economy and of policy, the former referring to 
the study of human action under given institutional rules; the latter to the rules of the 
game. He did not exclude the importance of normative economics. Still, this branch was 
to remain an exercise in simulation, with little or no room for decision-making by the 
economist. Later on, the same perspective was also typical of Walras and of a number 
                                                 
1 See Fontaine (1996). As will be clarified later on, Hayek (1960[1978]) definitely subscribed to this 
view. More recently, a similar approach was also advocated by Buchanan (1979), who insisted on the 
notion of economics as a system of voluntary exchange generated by - and giving origin to - agreed-upon 
rules. These rules are named institutions and represent an essential feature of economic analysis.  
2 Smith’s vision is not entirely clear, though. For instance, Grampp (2000) argues that Adam Smith 
supported a free market system because he believed this to be the best way to promote the social good – 
in his case the accumulation of national wealth and military power. As a matter of fact, this would explain 
why Smith did not hesitate to claim that natural rights and individual freedom should be set aside when 
the public good - e.g. national power or even fairness - is at stake. Hayek will devote the whole Epilogue 
of (1979 [1981]) to justifying his rejection of a natural-right approach.    
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of more recent authors. Lionel Robbins, for instance, understood policy-making to be 
dependent on moral judgement; and thus unacceptable if economics was conceived as a 
way of reasoning and an instrument to understand individual or group behaviour. 
Indeed, he argued that it would make little sense to use a logical tool in order to derive 
normative prescriptions. In Harry Johnson’s words, it would be unreasonable and 
probably counterproductive (see Tyszynski 1955 and Mackintosh 1950).  
  Contrary to Say, Hayek chose not to consider normative economics as a mere 
exercise in simulation with little practical relevance. At the same time, however, he was 
also unwilling to accept the technocratic approach based on descriptive, a-theoretical 
economics and scenarios. Not surprisingly, while trying to find out a suitable 
compromise between socialist planning and (unconditional) free-market capitalism, he 
stumbled into a dilemma. On the one hand he could draw on the early foundations of 
political economy and follow the ‘constitutional economics’ approach. As made explicit 
by Buchanan (1979) and, more generally,  by most of the public-choice and the 
ordoliberal schools, since economic action takes place within an institutional 
framework, the economist should analyse the features of an optimal context, so as to 
enhance voluntary exchange and widen the choices available to the agents. In other 
words, economy policy should propose constitutional solutions aimed at reducing 
transaction costs, while leaving individuals more or less free to adopt or reject such 
solutions. When the notion of social contract is added - which implies that it exists, that 
its elements are well specified and that all the members of a community are required to 
act in accordance with them - this a-moral version of policy-making develops into 
normative prescriptions for the production of the goods and services described in the 
social contract. 
Another possibility open to Hayek was related to the existence of social norms, 
informal behavioural patterns emerged over long time periods and generally subject to 
varying degrees of enforcement. In some cases norms have become ways through which 
individuals identify their position in society (e.g. manners). In other cases - and more 
important for the scope of these pages  - they are a means to reduce the cost of 
cooperation within a community of interacting  individuals. In the past informal 
arrangements were characterised by repeated trial and error experiences within 
relatively close communities. Tradition and customs would thus gradually reveal the  
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nature and stringency of social norms. Surely, little room was left to ambiguity or to the 
discretion of the would-be policy-maker. If anything, politics was just a synonym for 
the procedure through which selected individuals were given the power to enforce 
compliance with the social norms.  
Predictably, the conceptual gap separating social norms from policy-making is 
hard to bridge, even for Hayek. Whereas social norms do reflect an informal  social 
contract originating from repeated voluntary interaction and trial-and-error processes, 
policy making at its best is a way to anticipate the results of the social contract that 
individuals would subscribe to if they had enough time to appreciate its terms
3. In other 
words, policy-making at its best is about guessing the terms of the social contract and – 
in an ideal world – conjecturing about those who would be willing to sign it.  
In the end, and for reasons that remain largely unexplained
4, Hayek opts for a 
view of economic policy which consists of a set of spontaneous rules supplemented by 
artificial norms created by government and cleared by ‘legislators’
5. Their purpose is to 
replicate  – or, rather, anticipate  – social norms. Although he does not frequently 
mention it with the clarity that the subject deserves, this argument refers to the so-called 
‘acceleration of time’
6. This situation materialises as informal institutions tend to come 
to the surface only gradually, so that their evaluation through a trial-and-error process 
becomes too slow to be of significant use, especially when the features of the problems 
to be solved through individual interactions change rapidly. Under such circumstances, 
timely top-down rule making (policy making) can be desirable and replaces slow 
                                                 
3 Note that this notion of the social contract is different from that advocated by Buchanan (1979). 
According to the argument developed in the text, Hayekian policy-making reflects a social contract that 
would have emerged as a consequence of a spontaneous, time-consuming process leading to asocial 
norm. On the other hand, in Buchanan’s view the social contract is what the individuals would have 
chosen had they been behind a veil of ignorance.  
  This view presents two major weaknesses, though. First, policy-makers cannot possibly know what 
individuals would choose behind the veil of ignorance. Second, people do not choose behind a veil of 
ignorance; indeed, the history of mankind can be described as the continuous effort to reduce the size of 
the veil before taking a decision.   
4 Even Caldwell (2004) provides very little information on this account.  
5 Hayek’s notion  of ‘Legislative Assembly’ is in fact what one would currently label as ‘Constitutional 
Court’. See in particular (1978 [1981, chapter 17]).  
6 See Hayek (1973 [1983, pp.88-89]; 1960 [1978, p.286]) and, more generally, Denzau and North (1994) 
and Fiori (2002).   
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bottom-up rules. Hence, the Hayekian enriched version of constitutional economics 
does not preclude freedom to choose, but admits coercion when geared to reproducing a 
social contract that the acceleration of time makes hard to perceive.  
By and large, this defines Hayek’s project for a liberal society, away from 
laissez-faire and  - in his view  - strong enough to resist socialist attacks. And also 
explains why from the end of the 1930s Hayek tried to find ways to replicate/anticipate 
a plausible social contract, and then to justify it without using constructivism. The pages 
that follow examine these efforts in some detail and conclude that the results attained 
are far from persuasive. Economic policy always requires the definition of the shared 
goals and priorities, of the tools to be employed and of the policy-maker in charge of 
implementation. Unfortunately, Hayek’s work remains somewhat wanting on the 
legitimacy of both the instruments and the actors; and thus ambiguous. If so ‘he has no 
complete theory of the social order to back up his liberal recommendations’, which 
contributes to making ‘modern  liberalism vulnerable to erosion and invasion by 
incompatible elements’ (De Jasay  (1996, p.107).  
 
 
Hayek’s views on policy action 
Consistent with the Austrian tradition, Hayek deals with economic policy as a social 
philosopher, rather than as an economic technocrat or a political theorist. In particular, 
he focuses on the aims of policy-making in a society where human dignity and thus 
liberty are supposed to be the primary moral component, and proposes to ‘design the 
most rational permanent framework within which the various activities would be 
conducted by different persons according to their individual plans’ (1944 [1979, p.26]). 
It is therefore manifest since the beginning of his intellectual journey that although 
some elements of such framework are the legacy of the past (customs, traditions, 
implicit contracts), Hayek also considers other elements, which stem from human 
design and are conceived through a procedure of ‘consensus behind a veil of ignorance’, 
whereby the social designer cannot act in order to benefit or damage specific individuals 
or groups deliberately. Compliance with this procedure provides legitimacy to policies, 
so as to protect and/or reproduce the results generated by the appropriate set of long- 
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term, stable social norms that would have emerged spontaneously if agents had not been 
hindered by transaction costs or surprised by the acceleration of time, as aired earlier.  
In fact, Hayek’s offensive against economic policy is weaker and less 
comprehensive than may appear at first sight. It is a Third Way between dirigisme and 
laissez faire where the state plays two roles: (i) it provides a framework where 
individual action develops and (ii) it meets those social needs that the market fails to 
satisfy because of externalities
7. It happens to be illegitimate only when it becomes the 
instrument of discretionary bureaucratic interference with the social norms (loosely 
understood as a synonym for social contract) - both directly, through rules issued by the 
bureaucrats themselves; and indirectly, when bureaucrats arbitrarily enforce the rules 
conceived by the social philosophers or by the politicians
8. Although this is surely an 
important limitation, it is not enough to deter Hayek from advocating state funds in 
favour of  generalised education, sanitation, minimum-income legislation, adequate 
infrastructure, information, quality control, sporting and cultural activities, collective 
insurance vis-à-vis catastrophic, unpredictable events
9. And also behavioural rules that 
should not replace individual preferences (1973 [1983, p.51]), but nevertheless shape 
human action and make it easier to predict. In short, the state is ‘a piece of utilitarian 
machinery intended to help individuals in the fullest development of their individual 
personality’ (1944 [1979, p.57]). Unfortunately, one does not know how to assess when 
the state helps spontaneous development and when it drives such development: ‘Unlike 
classical liberalism that confines the state to the provision of a single public good, law 
enforcement, Hayek’s social order is less, rather than more, clear-cut: it permits, if not 
                                                 
7 Indeed, Hayek often fails to distinguish between an externality stricto sensu and a residual explanation 
for why allegedly desirable states of the world fail to materialize. Therefore, since he believed that direct 
state intervention is justified - if not required - whenever externalities are relevant and widely recognized, 
government intervention ends up by being appropriate whenever the state of the world could be improved 
with no obvious costs. More on this at fn. 21. 
8 According to Hayek (1960 [1978, p.112-115]) the politician does not have ideas and should merely 
represent conventional thought: ‘His task in a democracy is to find out what the opinions held by the 
largest number are, not to give currency to new opinions which may become the majority view in some 
distant future’ (ibid. at p.112). On the contrary, the social philosopher is an intellectual innovator who 
conceives new, possibly welfare-enhancing ideas or general principles that agents may or may not accept.  
9 See Hayek (1944 [1979, pp. 89-90], 1960 [1978, pp.141,144, 223, 257, 258, 364, 365, 375, 383], 1978 
[1981, chapter 14]). On the other hand, some doubts on the existence of natural state monopolies are aired 
in (1979 [1981, p.147])  
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positively mandates, the state to produce any number in any quantity’ (De Jasay 1996, 
p.113). 
  Put differently, although Hayek emphasises the crucial role of liberty, he reasons 
that nothing useful can come to birth in a vacuum (which he wrongly considers a 
synonym for laissez faire). And hastens to fill in the vacuum by appealing to common 
sense, search for compromise, expediency. By holding on to these two arguments 
(individual liberty and  horror vacui) and carefully avoiding to discuss the intrinsic 
conflicts, Hayek’s well-known condemnation of scientism actually excludes bad policy-
making, rather than policy-making  per se; and leaves plenty of room for social, 
piecemeal engineering, to be carried out by enlightened political action applied to 
economic activities. He therefore succeeds in attracting consensus from the anti-
socialist ranks when attacking scientism and positivism, i.e. historicism, objectivism 
and the foundations of socialism (Saint-Simon and Comte). And in enticing those who 
believe in the existence of the common interest, a notion that Hayek believes can be 
defined by means of an idealised version of majoritarian democracy
10. It is hard to say 
whether Hayek himself was aware of the blurred border between general rules 
(constitutional law making by enlightened, possibly arrogant political philosophers
11) 
and detailed rules (scientism by rational and selfish bureaucrats or shortsighted 
politicians). He must have had s erious fears, though; since after (1960 [1978]) he 
repeatedly tried to keep the two categories apart and explain - without much success, in 
our view - why public-choice analysis applies to the latter but not to the former.  
 
                                                 
10 Hayek seems to have mixed feelings about democracy, that vary from unqualified praise (see the 
Constitution of Liberty) to scepticism. He will then solve his doubts by distancing himself from the 
current version of democracy (cum unlimited governmental powers) and suggesting a concept closer to 
that predating the French Revolution – demarchy ( cum constrained governmental powers). His ideal 
political construction is fully detailed in Hayek (1978 [1981]), where democracy is somewhat naively 
described as ‘a certain framework for arriving at political decisions, and tells us nothing about what the 
aims of government ought to be’ (p.98). 
11 In some cases the Constitution should spell out and thus impose principles that are ‘too unfamiliar to 
expect courts to comprehend’ (1979 [1981, pp. 148-149]).   
  7 
Between bad socialism and good policy-making 
As the previous pages suggest, according to the main thesis put forward in this article 
Hayek’s view on economic policy depends heavily on his idea of a society of free 
individuals protected by super constitutional arrangements. These arrangements should 
be the absolute barrier against socialism and the growing conviction that governments 
ought to play a major part in shaping people’s daily life (1944 [1979, p.9])
12. This is 
little more than a façade, though. For Hayek’s view the real problem with socialism is 
not so much the violation of individual freedom, as collectivisation. This approach has 
two consequences. It does not oblige Hayek to confront natural rights and the 
sacredness of private property (which he is not willing to accept); and leaves the door 
open to non-socialist coercion, to be applied whenever the results are not satisfactory:  
‘in the ordering of our affairs we should make as much as use as possible of 
the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion 
… There is […] all the difference between deliberately creating a system 
within which competition will work as beneficially as possible, and 
passively accepting institutions as they are. Probably nothing has done so 
much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on 
certain rough rules of thumbs, above all the principle of laissez-faire. Yet in 
a sense this was necessary and unavoidable …. Nothing short of some hard-
and-fast rule would have been effective. And since a strong presumption in 
favour of industrial liberty had been established the temptation to present it 
as a rule which knew no exceptions was too strong always to be resisted’ 
(ibid., p.13).  
                                                 
12 Hayek held laissez-faire responsible for this state of affairs. He maintained that its alleged success in 
the XIX century led people to take the results of market forces for granted and concentrate on collective 
goals (ibid., p.15). 
  Curiously enough, a few years later Hayek’s connection between  laissez faire and socialism 
disappeared, and a large part of the Counter-Revolution of Science was actually devoted to showing the 
links between rationalism, positivism and ultimately socialism. Hayek (1960 [1978, p. 60] finally closed 
the circle by saving the classical –liberal school. He followed Renan’s view on liberalism and maintained 
that laissez faire actually originated from Rationalism ‘as the very words show’ - rather than from the 
classical-liberal tradition. Did Hayek truly believe that the radical Austrian school was a by-product of the 
French Revolution?  
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and   
‘There were many tasks […] where there could be no doubt that the 
government possessed enormous powers for good and evil; and there was 
every reason to expect that with a better understanding of the problems we 
should some day be able to use these powers successfully’ (ibid., p.14) 
Unfortunately, Hayek does not attempt to clarify who has to decide about the features 
and desirability of the exceptions, or how the decision-making process should take 
place. Nor does he explain when better knowledge of the problems legitimises 
government to use its coercive powers
13. For instance, after having warned the reader 
about the dangers of government intervention, he makes it explicit that ‘where it is 
impossible to create the conditions necessary to make competition effective, we must 
resort to other methods of guiding economic activity’ (ibid., p.27), even if that implies 
expropriation or compulsory purchase (1978 [1981, p.62-63])
14. The same applies to 
monopolies (ibid., pagg.29 and 147) as well as to a variety of other situations.  
                                                 
13 As we know, the challenge had already been raised by the libertarian school - from Rothbard to de 
Jasay and Hoppe - and it involved the difference between Saint-Simon’s Council of Newton on the one 
hand, and Hayek’s custodians of the rule of law on the other. Hayek’s reply was elusive. In the Road to 
Serfdom (ch. XV) he believed that an international authority should take care of drafting and enforcing 
proper rules at a supra-national level (constitutional engineering once again). He later addressed the 
question at a national scale, but the answer provided in (1978 [1981]) - elected assemblies of highly paid 
representatives - defined the nature of the problem once more. Surely, it did not solve it. He also favoured 
moderate decentralisation among competing local agencies in the provision of public services, subject 
however to centralised control as regards legitimacy. Both the central and the local agencies are also 
expected to compete with the private sector (1978 [1981, pp.47,49], except for the fact that the latter has 
no right to cover costs through taxation.  
14 This position is not too far from what the Saint-Simonians were advocating a little more than a century 
earlier. Indeed, although Hayek strongly opposed the Saint-Simonian attitude towards private property 
(1952 [1979, chapter 13]), when it comes to choosing between freedom and expropriation he opts for the 
latter. His justification is that ‘we still lack adequate theoretical principles for a satisfactory solution of 
some of the problems which arise in this field’ (1978 [1981, p.63]). 
  More generally, Hayek sometimes does not seem to have a very clear idea about free-market principles. 
When it comes to inheritance taxes, for instance, it is obvious that the liberal argument against taxation 
focuses on the fact that taxation interferes with the parents’ desire to sacrifice their own consumption in 
order to enhance their children’s welfare. Taxation is indeed a tax on altruism or family affection. 
Surprisingly, however, H ayek criticises inheritance taxes by referring to their inefficiency, rather than 
their immorality (1960 [1978, chapter 6]). Other examples are provided by his view of competition, 
which is unfair if a successful producer ‘keeps out a potential competitor by offering specially favourable 
terms to customers only in the limited region in which a newcomer at first will be able to compete’ (1979 
[1981, p.84]). Or by his support for progressive income taxation based on the fact that indirect taxation is 
necessarily regressive (1979 [1981, p.127]).   
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Hayek’s view about economic policy is thus characterised by two essential and 
persistent elements: the need to develop some kind of constitutional engineering and to 
adjust for externalities, which justify state coercion, as explained at length in (1960 
[1978]). The former turns out to be not only desirable, but also necessary, if a market 
economy is to generate the best possible results. The latter is always welcome, as long 
as intervention remains within the boundaries set by the rule of law. In a word, as long 
as the rule of law is not violated, government intervention is admitted and leads to the 
production goods and services (e.g. insurance services against catastrophic events and 
unemployment), the redistribution of income by means of taxation (including 
substantial inheritance taxes) and the regulation of production (1944 [1979, p.60])
15.  
The core question then clearly revolves around Hayek’s notion of the rule of 
law, defined as a set of ‘rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it 
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge’ 
(see for instance 1944 [1979, p.54] and 1973 [1983, p.108]). Apparently this definition 
does not include freedom of contract, since  
‘to limit working hours or to require certain sanitary arrangements is fully 
compatible with the preservation of competition … nor is the preservation of 
competition incompatible with an extensive system of social services – so long 
as the organisation of  these services is not designed in such a way as to make 
competition ineffective over wide fields’ (1944 [1979, p.28]).  
Hayek will indeed modify his view later on, when the emphasis moves from 
certainty and predictability to the notion of just conduct, ‘as a means for assisting in the 
pursuit of a great variety of individual purposes’
16. But his argument basically remains 
                                                 
15 See also the third part of (1960 [1978]) and (1978 [1981, chapter 14]) for a complete list of Hayek’s 
public goods, which includes even entrepreneurship (‘certain experimental developments’ to use his own 
words). Hayek (1960 [1978, chapter 6]) will subsequently change his mind about inheritance taxes. And 
he will also deny that being part of a national group justifies compulsory income transfers (ibid., pp. 101-
102). 
16 See also (1976 [1978, p.5 and 37]):  ‘The chief function of rules of just conduct is thus to tell each what 
he can count upon, what material objects or services he can use for his purposes, and what is the range of 
actions open to him’. Hayek (1973 [1983, pp. 2-3]) was aware of the fact that the rule of law raised some 
problems as an operational device, but attributed them to a lack of understanding, rather than to the 
conceptual weakness of the very notion.    
  10 
an attack against privileges or burdens for selected interest groups known in advance
17, 
and an appeal for a political system that creates stable rules behind a veil of ignorance
18. 
Sometimes the veil drops, though. For Hayek also conceives an ideal world where a set 
of desirable features must be in place (including the absence of externalities). The lack 
of such features is characterised as market failures, and the state is called upon to fill the 
gap and cover the costs through taxation: ‘far from advocating […] a minimal state, we 
find unquestionable that in an advanced society government ought to use its power of 
raising funds by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons 
cannot be provided, or cannot be provided adequately, by the market’ (1978 [1981, 
p.41]). Furthermore, ‘There are common needs that can be satisfied only by collective 
action and which can thus be provided for without restricting individual liberty’, and 
‘There is no reason why the volume of these pure service activities should not increase 
with the general level of wealth’ (1960 [1978, p.257]). As a result, Hayek’s  
spontaneous order is no longer an alternative to rationalism, but a desirable situation 
where repeated interactions may have given birth to patterns of predictable behaviour 
and where order (i.e. predictable behaviour) has to be enhanced on a case by case basis, 
whenever it does not appear spontaneously
19. As De Jasay (2004) has recently pointed 
out, in Hayek’s view  
‘the market, law and its enforcement must first secure property and contract 
against violation, and then the market order will spontaneously emerge as a 
result of individual interactions within this framework of safety and 
predictability. [Put differently,]law is a product of collective choice and so is its 
                                                 
17 See for instance (1976 [1978, p.137]).  
18 See also (1976 [1978, p.132]). Of course, even the abolition of a bad rule – for instance trade barriers – 
would violate Hayek’s notion of the rule of law, for it would provoke damages to selected strata of the 
population. Not even Hayek could deny that the victims and the beneficiaries of a transition to a free 
trade-regime would be clearly identified. In fact, Buchanan’s position is easier to understand, in that he 
introduces the veil of ignorance not to justify economic policy, but to justify the social contract that 
implies economic policy. There is no doubt that the veil of ignorance is a more effective rhetoric device to 
justify the ends of the individual signing the social contract, rather than to explain the ends and means of 
government intervention.  
19 See (1973 [1983, p.36 and chapter 5]) and (1973  [1983, chapter 2]). A similar logical twist also 
characterises Hayek’s view of the welfare state as compatible with (his version of) the rule of law and 
thus with free-market principles, including subjectivism (1944 [1979, pp. 89-91]). This approach is of 
course rejected by the orthodox Austrians à la Mises who are critical of top-down government action; and 
also by the Ordoliberals, who criticise his piecemeal approach – see in particular Vanberg (1996).   
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enforcement … Hayek’s spontaneous order, then, is not spontaneous, for it 
includes the government as a necessary condition, and government action is 
purposive’.  
Surely, Hayek is well aware of the fact that extensive state action might distort 
individual behaviour. But he is inclined to elude the problem by arguing that when this 
happens, then it means that privileges are being created and the rule of law violated. Put 
differently, on the one hand the reader is being told that economic policy is welcome 
when the market fails. On the other hand he is warned that economic policy is not 
acceptable when it creates winners and losers and thus distorts incentives.  
 
 
Hayek’s need for a social contract 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, from the late 1930s Hayek was suggesting 
that market-oriented economic policy was to be preferred to central planning. But the 
need for economic p olicy, and for sensible policy making as a whole, was not 
questioned.  
More generally, Hayek criticised the Middle Way, but also hurried up to 
recommend allegedly neutral, state solutions to hypothetical market failures. 
Unfortunately, he did not see that such failures called for property-right solutions. This 
blindness prevented him from grasping the notion of externality
20, deprived his 
conception of rule of law of the only intellectual anchor it could count on  - the 
principles of ‘private property and freedom of contract’ (ibid., p.28) - and forced him to 
apply rule of law according to rather questionable common-sense principles (opinion 
and ‘universalizability’, to be explained shortly). As one may have noticed, Hayek 
correctly refrains from referring to spontaneous order; for it would be incompatible with 
not-so spontaneous rules of the game, which are however desirable according to the 
                                                 
20 In Hayek’s view an externality is the effect of one’s action on other individuals (see 1978 [1981, p.43-
44]). Since he could not argue that all actions provoking disappointment or envy need to be regulated or 
require compensation, compliance with his notion of the rule of law needed to be assessed case by case, 
following common sense. Surprisingly, Hayek never refers to a negative externality as an encroachment 
on somebody else’s property right.   
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Hayekian vision. Once again, when discussing competition he adds that ‘we cannot, 
within the scope of this book enter into a discussion of the very necessary planning 
which is required to make competition as effective and beneficial as possible’ (ibid., 
p.31). And when arguing for redistribution and a minimum welfare state, he is not sure 
whether they should be justified in order to buy consensus against special interest (ibid., 
p.156)
21, or just because not having it is a deficiency:  
‘some security is essential if freedom is to be preserved’ (1944 [1979, p.99]) and 
‘adequate security … will have to be one of the main goals of policy’ (ibid., pp. 
98-99). 
‘capitalism as it exists today has many remediable defects that an intelligent 
policy of freedom ought to correct. A system which relies on the spontaneous 
ordering of forces of the market, once it has reached a certain level of wealth, is 
also by no means incompatible with government providing, outside the market, 
some security against severe deprivation’ (1976 [1978, p. 136]).  
The logical weakness of this position can only be overcome by introducing new 
conceptual tools. Authors like Leoni (1961 [1991]) and de Jasay (1985 [1998]) clearly 
perceived that the only instrument that social scientists can use in order to reach a 
compromise is the social contract. Indeed, Buchanan’s success owes a great deal to 
having assumed a social contract, irrespective of its moral foundations (legitimacy). 
Hayek never mentions it explicitly and actually denies its validity
22. In fact, he replaced 
the social contract with the rule of law, the difference between the two being the same 
as that between a state ruled by bureaucrats with discretionary power
23 and one 
composed by social philosophers (politicians) with the monopoly of violence. More 
subtly, by sidestepping the discussion on the social contract, Hayek could actually treat 
                                                 
21 Oddly enough, Hayek does not perceive the contradiction embedded in his argument. If the 
beneficiaries of the welfare state can be classified as ‘special interest’, then the Hayekian welfare state is 
in contrast with Hayek’s fundamental rule-of-law criterion. On the other hand, if the beneficiaries are not 
special interests, it is not clear why traditional pressure groups should be satisfied by the welfare state and 
feel that no more rent-seeking activities should be pursued.  
22 See (1960 [1978, chapter 4]) where Hayek states that the very notion of social contract is the fruit of 
Rationalism, and thus unacceptable for any follower of the Scottish Enlightenment - including Hayek 
himself, of course. 
23 See also Hayek (1960 [1978. ch.13]).   
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it as a fact, rather than a serious concern for the social philosopher: ‘constitutions are 
based on, or presuppose, an underlying agreement on more fundamental principles – 
principles which may never have been explicitly expressed, yet which make possible 
and precede the consent and the written fundamental laws’ (1960 [1978, p.181]).  
As a by-product, this ‘underlying agreement’ explains and justifies the state 
monopoly of violence: ‘Coercion, however, cannot be altogether avoided because the 
only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by 
conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state’ (ibid., p.21)
24. And legitimacy is now 
maintained by reference both to the veil of ignorance, following the lines already 
sketched in the Road to Serfdom:  
‘Even where coercion is not avoidable, it is […] being made impersonal and 
dependent upon general, abstract rules, whose effects on particular individuals 
cannot be foreseen at the time they are laid down. […] Coercion […] then 
becomes an instrument assisting the individuals in the pursuit of their own ends 
and not a means to be used for the ends of others’. (ibid.).  
and to a new concept - opinion - defined as  
‘ a common tendency to approve of some particular acts of will and to 
disapprove of others, according to whether they do or do not possess certain 
attributes which those who hold a given opinion usually will not be able to 
specify. So long as the legislator satisfies the expectation that what he resolves 




                                                 
24 This view brings Hayek much closer to Hobbes and away from the classical liberals. Indeed, a classical 
liberal or a libertarian would never believe that a politician or a bureaucrat could pursue the private 
interest better than the individual involved and independent of the individual’s opinions on the matter.  
25 See also (1976 [1978, p. 14]), where the concept of opinion is suggested as the driving principle to 
evaluate the legitimacy of policy action, i.e. to draw the line between arbitrary interference and 
intervention within the rule of law.   
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A Manifesto against freedom 
When encouraging policy-makers to intervene and enhance the acquisition of 
knowledge, improve on bad past legislation and question defective traditions, gain 
consensus, Hayek did perceive the problem of misuse of power:  
‘restraints […] on the power of the legislator could, of course, be made more 
effective and more promptly operative if the criteria were explicitly stated by 
which it can be determined whether a particular decision can be a law. But the 
restraints which in fact have long operated on the legislatures have hardly ever 
been adequately expressed in words.‘ (1973 [1983, p.93])
26.  
Still, his call for explicit rules defies centuries of political history, while his 
proposal to submit the legitimacy of the new rules to the test of ‘universalizability’ 
remains elusive
27. For either the policy-maker is in fact just proposing social 
arrangements that may reduce the cost of human interaction and that individuals are free 
to accept or reject, possibly through a trial-and-error process characterised by 
competition in an evolutionary context. Or the policy-maker has the right to impose 
such social arrangements as long as they may be qualified as moral
28.  
One can of course answer by arguing that all the arrangements conceived behind 
a veil of ignorance are welcome by agents. Which is hardly credible, even from a purely 
Hayekian viewpoint. It doesn’t take much to see that the politician does not necessarily 
use his power of coercion to minimise transaction costs in a society, that he never 
operates behind a veil of ignorance, let alone his knowing how people would behave 
and what they would choose behind the veil. Another possibility to avoid to choose is to 
                                                 
26 See also (1976 [1978, pp.28-29]). 
27 The test of ‘universalizability amounts to a test of compatibility with the whole system of accepted 
rules […] which may either lead to a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer or may show that, if the system of rules is 
to give definite guidance, some of the rules will have to be modified’ (1976 [1978, pp.28-29]).  
28 Hayek (1960 [1978]) explains that institutions are ‘convention and customs of human intercourse’, 
which involve a moral code as well as general and ‘unconscious adherence to moral rules’. Therefore, 
coercion is not necessary only ‘when individuals can be expected as a rule to conform voluntarily to 
certain principles’ (p.62). At the same time, Hayek is aware that coercive rules are deplorable and are not 
conducive to desirable evolution. This is why they ‘can be broken by individuals who feel that they have 
strong reasons to brave the censure of their fellows’ (p.63). Indeed, the author could not have done better 
to confuse his readers. See also ibid. at p. 67, 146-147 for yet other views of the same subject.  
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claim that institutions come from the past, as a result of tradition and spontaneously-
developed rules. Following our previous terminology, from this viewpoint the social 
contract has not been agreed upon, but has been revealed through history (1960 [1978, 
chapter 4]). Therefore, one may infer that the policy-maker is not a social philosopher 
designing social arrangements, but one interpreting and enforcing the allegedly revealed 
social contract by transforming it into a law. Unfortunately, it is not clear what happens 
if different social scientists have different perceptions as regards revelation. And not 
many classical liberals would agree with Hayek’s notion whereby ‘liberalism regards it 
as desirable that only what the majority accepts should in fact be law’ (ibid., p.103)
29. 
Similar remarks apply to the notion of individual freedom, often quoted as the 
bulwark against arbitrary policy-making. In this case Hayek departs from the classical-
liberal position based on the familiar notion of ‘freedom from coercion’
30 and refers 
instead to the concept of responsibility: ‘freedom, namely a state in which each can use 
his knowledge for his purposes’ (1973 [1983, pp.55,56]). In particular, ‘the argument 
for liberty […] presupposes that a person is capable of learning from experience and of 
guiding his actions by knowledge thus acquired’ (1960 [1978, p.77]). Thus, liberty is no 
longer a (natural) right, but almost becomes part of a social contract, whereby in order 
to deserve it, one must show that he/she is able to profit from it. Once again, the policy-
maker creeps in through the back door to assess whether individual behaviour is 
consistent with a contract that also requires that ‘in our decisions as to whether a person 
is to be his own master or be subject to the will of another, we must regard him as […] 
either having or not having the right to act in a manner that may be unintelligible, 
unpredictable or unwelcome to others’ (ibid., p.78)
31.  
                                                 
29 The fact that he also writes that ‘it is not obvious that this same majority must also be entitled to 
determine what it is competent to do’ or that liberalism ‘accepts majority rule as a method of deciding, 
but not as an authority for what the decision ought to be’ hardly contributes to clarifying matters. See 
ibid. at pp.107 and 104.  
30 Hayek (1973 [1983, p.61, 62)] justifies his departure from the classical liberal lines by claiming that 
they were too vague to serve any operational purpose: ‘Laissez-faire […] never provided a criterion by 
which one could decide what were the proper functions of government’.  
31 Hayek suggests infants and idiots as examples of individuals that do not deserve liberty. Nevertheless, 
the notion of learning from experience and guidance of actions is much wider and goes well beyond those 
categories.   
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This departure from Austrian subjectivism plays an important role, since it 
allows Hayek to cry out against coercion and still favour constitutional constructivism. 
For in Hayek’s world individual A is subject to coercion not only if other individuals 
exercise physical or psychological violence towards him, but also if they refuse to act 
according to A’s wishes and such a refusal can jeopardise A’s existence (ibid., p.136). 
This statement has two important implications. First, it means that individual freedom is 
not valuable per se, but only if it is compatible with other agents’ basic needs. How 
basic a basic need is remains of course a matter open to debate. For instance Hayek 
mentions the owner of a spring in an oasis and claims that he should offer free water to 
all those who cannot pay and are about to die. The owner of the spring may indeed to 
decide to do so out of compassion. But he cannot be obliged to do so - as Hayek 
advocates - unless one violates the principle of private property. And also two other 
principles. One is responsibility, since those who adventure in the desert without 
enough water should take responsibility for their poor organisation or sheer bad luck. 
The second is the principle of entrepreneurship (and the ethics of profit), which would 
make sure that agents strive to find new wells, look after care of the existing oases, 
possibly establish a network of relief stations in the desert
32.  
  Other examples of the effects implied by Hayek’s notion of coercion apply to 
monopoly power and the labour market. In the former case regulation is required 
whenever ‘a monopolist is in a position to withhold an indispensable supply’ - be such 
an action a fact, or just a possibility (ibid., p.136). It is easy to observe that this idea is 
very close to that of ‘dominant position’, which today pervades mainstream economics: 
‘whenever there is a danger of a monopolist’s acquiring coercive power, the most 
expedient and effective method of preventing this is probably to require him to treat all 
customers alike, i.e. to insist that his prices be the same for all and to prohibit all 
discrimination on his part’ (ibid., p.136)
33. In the latter case Hayek welcomes regulation 
                                                 
32 Both principles recur frequently in Hayek’s works. But they seem to be forgotten when it comes to their 
policy implications.  
33 See also (1979 [1981, pp.84-85]), where the need for government action against price discrimination is 
argued forcefully. It may be worth pointing out that today not even socialist policy-makers would object 
to price discrimination.   
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‘in periods of acute unemployment’, when workers may be induced to accept unfair 
contracts (ibid., p.137).  
In short, individual liberty for Hayek means protection against coercion, and 
coercion means not only violence as commonly understood, but also resistance to the 
rule of law and need. And since for Hayek (1960 [1978]) taxation and compulsory 
military service are the outcome  of  - or at least compatible with  - the rule of law, 
resistance against both turns out to be an act of coercion
34. Put differently, the difference 
between the Hayekian and the socialist versions of acceptable coercion turns out to 
depend on how the social welfare function is defined. In the former case state 
intervention is justified when it enforces rules (of just conduct) or dominant-position 
conditions are feared
35; while in the latter intervention is legitimate whenever it is 
consistent with the social welfare function in general. But one suspects that the 
Hayekian definitions of rules or of potential dominant position are almost as arbitrary as 
any other is.  
  To conclude, Hayek’s recipe to make policy-making subject to the rule of law 
and to rely on state violence in order to eliminate coercion is not very persuasive. In his 
view the rule of law is in fact equivalent to a mix between constitutional straitjackets to 
restrain ordinary legislation, plus decision-making behind a veil of ignorance and 
according to general principles, with the purpose of inducing individuals to behave in a 
predictable way. The fragility of the veil of ignorance has already been mentioned 
earlier on. As regards general principles, Hayek (1960 [1978, ch. 10]) argues that they 
should not be created, but just discovered, since ‘they have grown through a gradual 
process of trial and error in which the experience of successive generations has helped 
                                                 
34 See ibid., p. 143 and also De Jasay (1995 [2002, p.87]), who observes that ‘Hayek, in making this 
singular distinction between coercive and noncoercive government actions, appears to be classifying 
taxation as noncoercive, a judgement that has an obvious bearing on his position regarding redistribution’.  
35 For some unexplained reason, this also applies to roads and sanitation (ibid., p.141), information (ibid., 
p.144), some kind of education and the advancement of knowledge in certain fields (ibid., p.223), which 
Hayek treats as if they were public goods and thus ‘a recognised field of public effort’. See also (ibid., pp. 
222-223) for the government production of public goods through general taxation, as long as the benefits 
cover the cost and ‘provide a favourable framework for individual decisions’.  
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to make them what they are’ (ibid., p.157)
36. This is the task of the legal scholars, 
whereas legislators stricto sensu should play the role of the benevolent policeman, and  
‘create conditions in which an orderly arrangement can establish and ever renew itself’ 
(ibid., p.161). In fact, Hayek replaces collectivism with some kind of enlightened 
policy-making, where neoclassical technocrats are to assist legal scholars, and legal 
scholars are supposed to establish what the rule of law is and make it explicit. In 
particular, they define when individuals are subject to state coercion. On the other hand, 
technocrats are meant to think of effective remedies when deviations from the rule of 




Policy-making beyond the rule of law 
Contrary to common belief, the role of state intervention in a Hayekian world is not 
confined to enforcing the rule of law and restraining the use of violence (coercion) by 
ordinary legislators and technocrats at large. Although one wonders whether state 
authorities would actually listen to legal scholars telling them what they can and what 
they cannot do (and hope that legal scholars all share the same opinion and resist the 
temptation to please state authorities), Hayek goes further and emphasises that coercive 
activities ‘will never be the only functions of government […]. [I]nfringements of the 
private sphere will be allowed […] in instances where the public gain is clearly greater 
than the harm done by the disappointment of normal individual expectations’ (1960 
                                                 
36 They reader may observe that Hayek also claims that at times traditional conventions and norms can be 
broken, for they should not be considered binding, after all. Unfortunately, Hayek provides no clear 
indication as for when a tradition is non-binding and when it is rule of law. Hence, although the idea of 
the legislator as a finder is appealing, it still begs the question of establishing the nature of what the finder 
has actually ascertained.  
37 Indeed, Hayek does not ignore that history has provided plenty of examples whereby constitutions have 
degenerated, also thanks to having introduced the separation of powers, as he notes when discussing the 
French and German cases (1960 [1978, chs.12-13]). Still, rather than drawing the obvious conclusions 
about the impossibility of constitutional constructivism, he simply concludes that such examples 
demonstrate the need for further safeguards.  
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[1978, pp. 206, 218])
38. The implications are not really clarified or examined in any 
detail. 
  Indeed, while Hayek squeezes the debate on the aims and legitimacy of 
economic policy into a question of rule of law, he says almost nothing about the 
instruments through which policy is to be carried out
39. He therefore reduces normative 
economics to a matter of personal judgement by the social philosopher. In turn, 
economic policy acquires strong social-democratic connotations, as rules must ‘ tell 
people which expectations they can count on and which not’, but ‘ it is clearly 
impossible to protect all expectations … which expectations must be protected must … 
depend on how we can maximise the fulfilment of expectations as a whole’ (1973 
[1983, pp.102-103]). In Hayek’s view that seems to be enough to justify breach of 
contract vis-à-vis employers (pickets and strikes)
40, taxation (to finance poverty-relief 
programs, social security, compulsory health insurance, agricultural improvements
41 
and constitutional design).  
Hayek does try to draw the line between the socialist welfare state and his own: 
the former being one where the taker decides about the  amount of redistribution, 
                                                 
38 Quite astonishingly, Hayek (1960 [1978, p.218]) suggests that the willingness of the public 
administration to compensate the individual is an acceptable criterion to compare private losses and 
public gains. He seems to forget both that civil servants carry out compensation by using somebody else’s 
money and that fair compensation is actually established by the buyer (the civil service). As a matter of 
fact, Hayek seems to be more interested in ‘fair socialism’, rather than individual freedom.  
   See also De Jasay (1995 [2002]) for a critical analysis of Hayek’s position and ambiguities on 
redistribution and the welfare state. 
39 True enough, Hayek does claim that policy action should not tamper with prices or quantities. That is 
hardly satisfactory, though. Income taxes do affect the relative price of human capital, while it is difficult 
to accept that according to a free-market approach ‘subsidies are a legitimate tool of policy, not as a 
means of income distribution, but only as a means of using the market to provide services which cannot 
be confined to those who individually pay for them’ (1960 [1978, p.264]). Indeed, Hayek is advocating 
redistributive justice within a market system steered by allegedly wise policy makers caring for the 
common good and possibly constrained by general rules set by equally wise legislators.  
40 See (1960 [1978,  p. 275]). 
41 According to Hayek (1960 [1978, chapter 23]), farmers should be subsidised, since they lack access to 
good information. And ‘We all have an interest in our fellow citizens’ being put in a position to choose 
wisely …; the question as to which of these services will be worth while and to what extent they should 
be carried is one of expediency and raises no fundamental issues’. (ibid., p.366).   
  20 
whereas the latter is one where the givers do
42. But of course, it is not clear what 
happens if a giver decides to give relatively little – or nothing at all; nor is it clear 
whether the Hayekian system is compatible with a democratic regime
43.  In the end, 
Hayek seems to be less hostile to planning than meets the eye
44, as long as good 
planning is enforced and bad planning rejected. In the case of town planning, for 
instance
45, good planners help the functioning of the market and operate through 
equitable compensation mechanism and set reasonable standards. Whereas bad planners 
enforce rules (without compensation) and engage in arbitrary decision making. After all, 
that is what a constructivist would argue: bad outcomes are the product of bad planners, 




During the XX century the economic profession grew more an more interested in 
exercises in social efficiency, whereby the economic policy-maker was to define sets of 
efficient solutions to assigned problems, and the politicians were supposed to choose the 
best option. The illusion of the benevolent policy maker and the true nature of the 
relation between redistribution, incentives and economic performance were exposed 
only in relatively recent times. Hayek’s role in this endeavour could hardly be 
overestimated.   
                                                 
42 Up to a point, though, for Hayek seems to replace socialism with populist pragmatisms: ‘the defraying 
out of the common purse of the costs of services which will benefit only some of those who have 
contributed to it will usually be agreed upon by the rest only on the understanding that other requirements 
of theirs will be met in the same manner, so that a rough correspondence of burdens to benefits will 
result’ (1973 [1983, p.140]). The same concept is repeated, for instance, in (1976 [1978, p.7]).  
43 Hayek is of course for democracy, as long as people are reasonably well educated by institutions free 
from political interference. Still, rather than being an argument supporting democracy, it sounds more like 
one for  compulsory education financed by taxpayers’ money, or for lifetime employment for state 
teachers (1960 [1978, chapter 24]). See also (1973 [1983, p.3]) and, more generally, (1978 [1981]), where 
Hayek mentions the broken promises of democracy. Nevertheless, the obvious and somewhat troubling 
consequences for his argument are not drawn and he offers instead a ‘better’ political constitution. 
44 Caldwell (2004, p.238) already noted Hayek’s early inclinations beyond individual planning, which 
make him sound ‘suspiciously like what the later Hayek would consider a social constructivist or, at the 
very least, a constitutional political economist’.  
45 See (1960 [1978, chapter 22])  
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Still, the lesson has not been learnt, let alone applied (Nelson 1987). This 
contribution has tried to argue that Hayek himself bore some responsibility  in this 
intellectual defeat, for his recipes were based on an enlightened version of  economic 
policy  (to be driven by suitable social philosophers), more or less restrained by a new 
constitutional order
46. More important, Hayek did not centre his research program on a 
clear and well-founded justification for policy-making, but rather on the constant effort 
to confine policy-making within reasonable, common-sense boundaries. Such 
boundaries are of course Hayek’s definition of the rule of law, which however proves to 
be unsatisfactory on two accounts. On the one hand, Hayek fails to provide a proper 
characterization: as a consequence, the rule of law turns out to be little more than a set 
of principles defined behind a veil of ignorance, possibly in accordance with a curious 
version of the freedom-from-coercion principle. The term ‘possibly’ should remind the 
reader that the Hayekian rule of law is in fact compatible with some redistribution, 
taxation, state production of goods and services and equitable compensation. When 
commenting on Hayek’s view of the welfare state, De Jasay (1991, pp. 15-16) is thus 
justified in claiming that ‘here is a clear call […] to re-create something like the 
“Swedish model” under the liberal banner. Horrified as Hayek would be by  the 
imputation of such a proposal, his exposition is fully consistent with it, and must be 
classed as “loosely liberal” for that reason’. On the other, he denies the principle of 
spontaneous order when spontaneity is not adequate or desirable: ‘there can b e no 
justification for representing the rules of just conduct as natural in the sense they are 
part of an external and eternal order of things, or permanently implanted in an 
unalterable nature of man’ (1976 [1978,pp.59-60]). As for assessing whether the rules 
of the game are appropriate or consistent with just conduct, his reference to legitimacy 
being based on public opinion cannot be taken seriously
47.  
Of course, by looking at today’s world one can maintain that both Hayek’s and 
Chicago-style liberalism describe an ideal, utopian picture. The first boils down to some 
kind of benevolent elite of social philosophers in charge of policy making, while the 
                                                 
46 As Caldwell (2004, p.206 and 289) notes, Hayek thought this to be one of his major achievements, and 
the answer to Keynes’ objections to his work in the area of political philosophy. 
47 ‘The power of the legislator [being derived] from a state of widespread opinion concerning the kind of 
rules he is authorized to lay down’ (1976 [1978], p.60]).  
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latter is obsessed by the notion of equilibrium and overlooks transaction costs and 
entrepreneurship. Still, whereas the Chicago approach is wrong, but consistent, Hayek’s 
world of constitutional engineering is fragile from the very beginning, for it is rooted on 
the same rules of the game that legitimate and therefore lead to discretionary power. To 
deny this is equivalent to denying the very behavioural hypotheses of human action, 
which Hayek observed in Western Culture and learnt from Mises (1948 [1963]). As we 
know, the alternative is a world featuring institutional competition, ultimately based on 
a notion of freedom originating from natural-right principles. Unfortunately, this is a 
vision to which Hayek sometimes agrees when advocating methodological 
individualism and  – even more  – Austrian subjectivism. But which he eventually 
neglects in order to be able to engage in ‘constitutional economics’.  
In this respect, Hayek’s divergence from Mises is hard to explain. Hayek’s 
ongoing efforts not to confront Mises on major issues doesn’t help, either
48. Perhaps, 
Hayek may have wanted to stop short of shocking his readers or the policy-makers as a 
whole, and thus avoid the very mistake he reproached to the classical liberals and the 
laissez-faire school. This is surely a feature throughout the Road to Serfdom, where he 
fails to elaborate a persuasive criterion to evaluate the legitimacy of economic policy
49. 
And becomes explicit in the 1970s, when he claimed that ‘attempts to push a principle 
further than general sentiment is yet ready to support it is apt to produce a reaction 
which may make impossible for a considerable period even what more modest attempts 
might have achieved’ (1976 [1978, p.58]).  One wonders, however, whether an alleged 
champion liberal thought should advocate accuracy and cohesion, or settle for political 
suitability and offer some kind of a Third Way composed of  a piecemeal list of 
government actions to meet specific goals in the economic sphere, the only perceptible 
policy criterion being one of consistency with the prevailing notion of just conduct. The 
price Hayek paid was however high. Not only was he forced time and again to appeal to  
expediency within a microeconomic context, and to go as far as denying some fifty 
years of Austrian business cycle economics by claiming that ‘it is merely common sense 
                                                 
48 See Caldwell (2004).  
49 Even his rule-of-law criterion starts to shake when he recommends that most wartime restrictions be 
kept in place for years to come (p.155), without even bothering to explain why.   
  23 
that government […] will step in when private investment flags, and thereby employ 
resources for public investment at the least cost and with the greatest benefit to society’ 
(1978 [1981, p.59]).  More important, ‘the effect of leaving out pieces from the jigsaw 
puzzle of social theory is that the vacuum is only too naturally filled by a false 
conception of the state. This conception is hardly compatible with liberal principles. 
Indeed, it is hardly compatible with the very market order that Hayek wants to be 
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